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INTRODUCTION
This Comment is concerned with the effects of inflation on the
taxation of debt. The current approach to the taxation of debt
creates several inflation-induced inequities and economic distor-
tions. Some of these inequities and distortions result directly from
the taxation of nominal interest which leads to the overstatement of
real interest income and expense. Others derive from the advanta-
geous tax treatment accorded other forms of capital income relative
to the treatment of interest income. Although the latter inequities
and distortions exist even under inflation-free conditions, they are
magnified by the existence of inflation. This Comment considers
the feasibility of eliminating these inequities and distortions by
altering the taxation of debt to account properly for the effects of
inflation.
As a theoretical matter, the merit of indexing debt for inflation
has been widely recognized.1 Yet significant disagreement remains
over the administrability of any actual indexation scheme.
2
Therefore, rather than recapitulate the detailed theoretical
arguments in favor of indexation, this Comment focuses on the
administrative and transitional issues that would arise in the
implementation of debt indexation, topics that have not been
addressed as thoroughly in the existing academic literature.
The magnitude of the inequities and economic distortions that
result from the taxation of nominal interest increases dramatically
t B.A. 1983, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1993, University of
Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank Professor Reed Shuldiner for his guidance
and support throughout the writing of this Comment.
1 See Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the Tax System for Inflation, in
UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 347, 373
(HenryJ. Aaron et al. eds., 1988); see als0John Bossons, Indexingfor Inflation and the
Interest Deduction, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 945, 945 (1984); Eugene Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage,
Inflation, and the Taxation of Interest Payments and Receipts, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 991,
1011-12 (1984); Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Almost Neutrality of Inflation, in DEVELOP-
MENT IN AN INFLATIONARY WORLD 419,419-20 (M.June Flanders & Assaf Razin eds.,
1981).
2 See HenryJ. Aaron, Inflation and the Income Tax: An Introduction, in INFLATION
AND THE INCOME TAX 1, 29 (HenryJ. Aaron ed., 1976); Halperin & Steuerle, supra
note 1, at 359.
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with higher maximum tax rates and elevated levels of anticipated
inflation.s This suggests that debt indexation is less important now
than it was in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when both tax rates
and inflation were significantly higher. Yet, lower tax rates and
reduced inflation also mean that the transitional effects of adopting
debt indexation would be much smaller now than were reform to
await renewed inflation and increased tax rates. 4  Thus, debt
indexation remains a reform worthy of serious consideration even
in the present economic climate.
This Comment is divided into five sections. Part I begins with
a brief discussion of the normative assumptions that underlie many
of the arguments made later. The economic effects of our present
method of taxing debt are then presented through a series of
numerical examples. Part II summarizes the inequities and
economic distortions that result from the failure to index debt for
inflation. Part II also discusses the revenue effects of debt index-
ation and provides an overview of the relevant administrability
issues. Part III considers several general topics in the implementa-
tion of debt indexation. These topics include the choice between
partial and comprehensive tax base indexation, the timing of the
indexation adjustment, the proper measurement of inflation, and
problems of distinguishing debt from other assets. Part IV
considers the issue of transition rules. After rejecting a number of
familiar rules, a novel transition scheme for debt indexation is
proposed and defended. Finally, Part V suggests specific methods
of administering debt indexation for various classes of debt.
I. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON DEBT
This Comment assumes that the correct tax base under the
federal income tax system is income rather than consumption.5
3 See Aaron, supra note 2, at 27; Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 349.
4 See infra note 164.
5 The difference between an income tax and a consumption tax is that under a
consumption tax, unconsumed income is not taxed when earned. For a theoretical
comparison of income and consumption taxes, see HARvEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE
468-77 (2d ed. 1988). Under a pure consumption tax, investment income, including
interest income, is not taxed per se, so the problem of properly measuring interest
income disappears. See Bossons, supra note 1, at 947.
Our present federal income tax system is, of course, a hybrid ofincome-type and
consumption-type taxation. Taxation of many forms of income is deferred, although
this deferral does not always extend until the income is ultimately consumed. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. § 219 (1988) (providing deduction for contributions to individual retirement
accounts); id. § 404 (providing deduction for contributions to qualified pension
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This assumption is necessary to establish a normative framework in
which to discuss the taxation of debt, a framework that our present
hybrid of income and consumption taxation cannot offer.6 This
Comment also adopts the classic Haig-Simons definition of
income. 7 According to the Haig-Simons definition, income is the
value of a person's rights that can be consumed without altering the
value of his pre-existing store of rights.8 This value is properly
measured by the potential quantity of real goods and services that
an individual could consume, rather than in nominal monetary
terms.9 Because an administrable tax system must assess income
in monetary terms, a tax based on Haig-Simon income requires
some form of adjustment to compensate for the decreasing real
value of money due to inflation.
Inflation affects the taxation of income under the Internal
Revenue Code ("the Code") in two ways. First, inflation affects the
tax rate structure by reducing the real value of all nominal dollar
amounts in the Code.10 This effect is easily eliminated by auto-
matically increasing these dollar figures based on the rate of
plans). To the extent that some mix of consumption and income taxation is
desirable, this mix can be achieved through provisions deferring taxation of specified
forms of income. Nonetheless, absent any specialjustification for deferring taxation
of income, it is assumed in this Comment that income should be taxed when it is
earned. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975) (defending the income tax ideal).
But see William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) (advocating a consumption-based tax); William D.
Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 947 (1975) (defending the fairness of a consumption-based tax).
6 Our present tax system contains elements of both income-type and consump-
tion-type taxation, but it does not choose between them in any principled way.
Without such an underlying principle, it is impossible to make strong claims about
the ]roper taxation of debt.
See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 49 (1938).
8 See id. Conformity with this ideal of income would require full accrual taxation.
Our present system is a hybrid of realization-based and accrual taxation, and
consistency with existing law will often support realization-based taxation in cases
where consistency with the Haig-Simons ideal would reject such treatment. Although
this conflict admits no ideal solution, accrual taxation in accord with the Haig-Simons
ideal is assumed in this Comment to be preferable unless it would create significant
administrative difficulties or enhanced tax arbitrage opportunities.
9 See Roger E. Brinner, Inflation and the Definition of Taxable Personal Income, in
INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 2, at 121-23.
10 See Aaron, supra note 2, at 5, 20-21 (noting that "inflation changes the rate
structure," primarily through decreasing the real value of personal exemptions, dollar-
limited credits, the standard deduction, and the size of the income brackets); Bossons,
supra note 1, at 952 n.15 (discussing the effect of inflation on the tax brackets).
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inflation.1 1 Second, inflation distorts the tax base by increasing
taxpayers' nominal income, causing them to pay tax on a greater
income than they would in the absence of inflation.
12 With
respect to debt, inflation increases interest rates, and higher interest
rates result in higher nominal interest income.13 The inflation-
induced component of interest is, in an economic sense, a partial
repayment of debt principal. Like other recoveries of capital, it
should not be treated as income or expense under the Haig-Simons
definition. Taxation of nominal interest under the present Code
incorrectly measures creditors' real income and debtors' real
expense on indebtedness by treating this inflation-induced compo-
nent of interest as taxable. 14 The following series of examples
illustrates the proper tax treatment of debt under inflationary
conditions and the economic effects of our present departure from
this ideal.
Example 1: C agrees to lend D the sum of $100 for a period of one
year. Both C and D anticipate an inflation rate of 5% and both
agree that C should receive an anticipated real rate of return of
2%. There is no credit risk15 and there are no taxes.
Absent taxes and credit risk, the nominal interest rate should
theoretically follow the formula:
rm0. = ( + rn.o) x (1 + ia) - 1
11 Many of these figures are already indexed to increases in the Consumer Price
Index. See infra note 129.
12 See Aaron, supra note 2, at 5-6.
13 Under inflationary conditions, creditors will demand increased nominal interest
rates because they must receive an additional return on the funds they loaned in
order to maintain the real value of these funds over the term of the debt. Debtors
will agree to pay higher nominal interest rates because they will be repaying the debt
principal in deflated dollars. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
14 Inflation also distorts the measurement of capital gains and losses, depreciation
deductions, and the cost of materials used (inventory). Net capital income is
measured by taking gross receipts from capital and subtracting any related capital
expenditures. Distorted measurement of capital income occurs under inflationary
conditions because receipts from capital and the corresponding capital expenditures
are often measured in dollars of significantly different real value. See generally Aaron,
supra note 2, at 6-14 (discussing the effects of inflation on the correct measurement
of depreciation deductions, capital gains and losses, and inventory valuation for tax
purposes). None of these areas ofinflation-induced tax base distortion-debt, capital
gains, depredation allowances, and inventories-are indexed under the present Code.
15 Credit risk, also known as default risk, is the risk that the debtor will be unable
to satisfy his debt obligation. Where a risk of default exists, the interest rate also
includes a default premium to compensate the creditor for his possible loss of capital.
See FRANKJ. FABOZZI ET AL., THE HANDBOOK Or FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 33 (3d ed.
1991).
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where r.on. is the nominal interest rate, rreal is the real interest rate,
and ia is the anticipated rate of inflation.16 Based on this formula,
the interest rate in Example 1 would be 7.10%.17 Assuming that
the parties did agree on an interest rate of 7.10%, at the end of the
year, G would receive $107.10 from D. Of this amount, $100.00
would constitute a return of nominal principal and $7.10 would
constitute nominal interest. Yet, of this $107.10, $105.00 actually
constitutes anticipated return of real principal, because $105.00 one
year in the future has the same anticipated real value as $100.00 has
at present.18 The remaining $2.10 constitutes anticipated real
interest at a rate of 2%, also in deflated dollars.
19
The previous interest rate formula can be rewritten as:
ro = r.t1 + i. + (r.a x Wa)
where the real interest rate and the anticipated rate of inflation are
small, the cross-product, rreal x ia, is much smaller than the sum, r,eal
+ ia, and can be ignored with little loss of accuracy. 20 This results
in the approximate interest rate formula:
r3 n, = r.a + i .
Using this approximate formula, the interest rate in Example 1
would be 7%.21 For the sake of simplicity, this approximate
interest rate formula is used for the remainder of this Comment.
16 For the classic presentation of this model of interest rates, see IRVING FISHER,
THE THEORY OF INTEREST (Augustus M. Kelley Bookseller 1967) (1930). See generally
RICHARD BREALEY& STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 558-61 (4th
ed. 1991) (discussing the propriety of Fisher's theory). For a modern statement, see
id. at 559. Critics of Irving Fisher's theory have challenged the assumption that the
real interest rate is unresponsive to changes in the rate of anticipated inflation. See
infra note 29. This Comment proceeds under the assumption that Fisher's formula
is approximately correct. Empirical evidence supports this position. See e.g., BREALEY
& MYERS, supra, at 560-61 (determining that a restatement of Fisher's formula
produced results only "a little less than we should expect if Fisher is right") (citing
Eugene F. Fama, Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of Inflation, 65 AM. ECON. REv.
269, 269-282 (1975)).
17 0.0710 = (1 + 0.02) x (1 + 0.05) - 1.
Percentages and their decimal equivalents will be used interchangeably
throughout this Comment.
18 $105 = $100 x (1 + 0.05).
19 $2.10 = $100 x 0.02 x (1 + 0.05).
20 For example, where the real interest rate and the anticipated rate of inflation
are both 10%, the cross-product is 1%, whereas the sum is 20%. Even at these rates,
the inaccuracy in calculating the nominal interest rate resulting from ignoring the
cross-product term is only 5%. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 16, at 559.
21 0.07 = 0.02 + 0.05.
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Example 2: The facts are identical to those in Example 1, except
that C and D both face a 50% marginal tax rate. 22 Debt is
indexed for inflation, meaning that the portion of nominal interest
that is necessary to maintain the real value of the debt principal is
excluded from taxation. The parties agree that C should receive
an anticipated, real pre-tax rate of return of 2%23 and that D
should pay an anticipated, real pre-tax interest rate of 2%.
Where debt is indexed for inflation, the interest rate should still
follow the formula given in Example 1.24 In Example 2, this
means that C will receive interest at a rate of 7%. 25 At the end of
one year, C will receive $107, of which $7 will be nominal interest.
The parties anticipate an inflation rate of 5%, so they anticipate that
$5 of this nominal interest will be excluded from taxation.2 6
Expected, real pre-tax interest is therefore $2,27 for an anticipated,
real pre-tax interest rate of 2%.28
Example 2A: The facts are identical to those in Example 2, except
that debt is not indexed for inflation. Any interest paid is fully
includable in income to C and fully deductible for D.
The general interest rate formula under proportional taxation
of full nominal interest income is:
r.,,w, = r,,ot + i. + [i x t/ (1 - t)]
where t is the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.29 For C to receive an
22 A taxpayer's marginal tax rate is the rate of tax that he will pay on his next
dollar of income. See MARVIN A. CHIRsTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4 (6th ed.
1991). The marginal tax rate thus determines how much an additional dollar of
income or deduction will be worth to a particular taxpayer. The marginal tax rate is
not the same as the average tax rate. A taxpayer's average tax rate is the percentage
of that taxpayer's total income represented by his total tax liability. See id. All future
references to tax rates refer to marginal rather than average rates.
23 If subject to a 50% tax, C will not demand that his real after-tax rate of return
remain at 2%, as it was in Example 1, because C's real after-tax rate of return from
other forms of capital will also be subject to the same 50% tax.
24 See supra formula in text accompanying note 21.
25 0.07 = 0.02 + 0.05.
26 $5 = $100 x 0.05.
27 $2 = $7 - $5.
28 0.02 = $2/ $100.
29 See Martin Feldstein, Inflation, Income Taxes, and the Rate ofInterest: A Theoretical
Analysis, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 809, 813 (1976); Vito Tanzi, Inflation, Indexation and
Interest Income Taxation, Q. REv., Mar. 1976, at 64, 73. This formula assumes that real
interest rates are unresponsive to changes in tax rates and the expected rate of
inflation. These assumptions are not uniformly accepted. See, e.g., Fiscal Aff. Dep't,
Int'l Monetary Fund, Interest Rates and Tax Treatment of Interest Income and Expense, in
TAXATION, INFLATION, AND INTEREST RATEs 3,16-22 (Vito Tanzi ed., 1984) (discussing
factors which would make real interest rates responsive to changes in the expected
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after-tax inflationary component, i0 , of 5%, the interest rate must
contain an additional tax-on-anticipated-inflation component, ia x
t / (1 - t), of 5%,30 resulting in a nominal interest rate of 12%.31
At the end of one year, C would receive $112, of which $12 would
be nominal interest. C would pay a tax of $6 on this $12 of nominal
interest income, and D would receive a $6 tax savings from his $12
interest deduction.3 2 Of the remaining $6 of after-tax interest, $5
represents anticipated return of principal33 and $1 represents
anticipated, real after-tax interest.3 4 At a 50% tax rate, this is
equivalent to $2 of anticipated, real pre-tax interest,35 for an
anticipated, real pre-tax interest rate of 2%.36
In Example 2, where debt was indexed for inflation, the parties
agreed to a nominal interest rate of 7% that resulted in an expected,
real pre-tax interest rate of 2% for both the creditor and the debtor.
In Example 2A, where debt was not indexed, the parties agreed to
a nominal interest rate of 12% that also yielded an anticipated, real
pre-tax interest rate of 2% for both parties. Examples 2 and 2A
thus demonstrate that where creditors and debtors face the same
marginal tax rate, they are able to compensate exactly for the
taxation of nominal interest by increasing the agreed upon interest
rate. 7 This ability does not exist, however, where creditors and
debtors face different tax rates, as the following examples demon-
strate.
rate of inflation or tax rate); Menachem Katz, Inflation, Taxation, and the Rate of
Interest in Eight Industrial Countries, 1961-82, in TAXATION, INFLATION, AND INTEREST
RATES, supra, at 172 (presenting empirical data supporting the responsiveness of
interest rates to inflation). This comment proceeds under the assumption that this
interest rate formula is sufficiently accurate to demonstrate the need for debt
indexation and to serve as the basis for developing and evaluating a transition scheme
for its implementation.
30 0.05 = 0.05 x 0.50 / (1 - 0.50).
3 0.12 = 0.02 + 0.05 + 0.05.
32 $6 = $12 x 0.50.
33 $5 = $100 x 0.05.
3$1 = $6 - $5.
35 $2 = $1 / (1 - 0.50).
36 0.02 = $2 / $100.
37 See generally Michael C. Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines for
Politymaking, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1217, 1253 (1989) (stating that competitive market
forces dictate that the taxation of nominal interest would have "no significant
consequences if the borrower and lender shared the same marginal tax rate"
(footnote omitted)).
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Example 3: The facts are identical to those in Example 2 except
that C now faces a tax rate of 10%, while D still faces a tax rate of
50%.
Under a system of debt indexation, real pre-tax rates of return
remain constant regardless of the marginal tax rates faced by
creditors and debtors. Thus, according to the formula given in
Example 1, C would receive a nominal interest rate of 7%. 38 As in
Example 2, the parties still anticipate that $5 of nominal interest will
be excluded from taxation.3 9 C anticipates $2 of real pre-tax
interest income, for a real, pre-tax rate of return of 2%.40 Similar-
ly, D anticipates a $2 interest deduction, for a real pre-tax interest
rate of 2%. Subject to certain refinements, Example 3 demonstrates
the method of taxing debt advocated by this Comment.
Example 3A: The facts are identical to those in Example 3, except
that debt is not indexed for inflation. Any interest paid is fully
includable in income to C and fully deductible for D.
As in Example 2A, D will still be willing to pay an interest rate
of 12%, because it will yield him an anticipated, real pre-tax interest
rate of 2%.41 However, because C anticipates facing only a 10%
tax, he will require a nominal interest rate of only 7.56% to achieve
an anticipated, real, pre-tax interest rate of 2%.42 If he received
nominal interest of $7.56, C would pay $0.76 in taxes. Of the
remaining $6.80, $5.00 would compensate C for anticipated
inflation, and $1.80 would be anticipated, real after-tax income. At
a 10% tax rate, this is equivalent to $2.00 of real pre-tax income.
43
Thus, at a nominal interest rate of 7.56%, C would anticipate a real,
pre-tax rate of return of 2%.
If C were the only potential creditor and D the only potential
debtor, the agreed upon interest rate would be somewhere between
7.56 and 12%, depending on the relative bargaining power of the
parties. C and D would, in effect, split the tax benefit created by
the taxation of nominal interest. Assuming that the parties agreed
upon a nominal interest rate of 9%, C would receive $9.00 of
38 0.07 = 0.02 + 0.05.
39 $5 = $100 x 0.05.
40 0.02 = $2 / $100.
41 0.12 = 0.02 + 0.05 + [0.05 x 0.50 / (1 - 0.50)]. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
42 0.0756 = 0.02 + 0.05 + [0.05 x 0.10 / (1 - 0.10)]. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
43 $2.00 = $1.80 / (1 - 0.10).
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nominal interest income, 44 on which he would pay a tax of
$0.90. 4 5 Of the remaining $8.10 of after-tax income, $5.00 would
compensate C for anticipated inflation, leaving C an anticipated,
real after-tax return of $3.10. This is $1.30 more than C needed to
obtain a real, pre-tax rate of return of 2%.46 This real after-tax
return of $3.10 is equivalent to a real pre-tax return of $3.44.47 C
therefore enjoys an anticipated, real pre-tax interest rate of 3.44%.
At a nominal interest rate of 9%, D will have a $9.00 deductible
interest expense. At D's marginal tax rate of 50%, this deduction
will produce a $4.50 tax savings.48 D will be left with an anticipat-
ed, nominal after-tax expense of $4.50. The component of interest
that constitutes anticipated repayment of principal due to inflation
is $5.00, resulting in an anticipated, real after-tax interest expense
of -$0.50.49 This after-tax expense of -$0.50 is $1.50 less than the
$1.00 that D would be willing to pay to achieve a pre-tax interest
rate of 2%,50 and is equivalent to a pre-tax interest expense of -
$1.00.5 1 D therefore enjoys an anticipated, real pre-tax interest
rate of -1.00%. Together, C and D enjoy a tax benefit of $2.80
under nominal taxation of debt.52 This benefit entails a corre-
sponding $2.80 loss in tax revenue.
53
44 $9 = $100 x 0.09.
45 $0.90 = $9 x 0.10.
46 $1.30 = $3.10 - $1.80. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
47 $3.44 = $3.10 / (1 - 0.10).
48 $4.50 = $9.00 x 0.50.
4 -$0.50 = $4.50 - $5.00.
50 To achieve a pre-tax interest rate of 2%, D would be willing to incur an
anticipated, pre-tax interest expense of $1. One dollar of pre-tax expense is
equivalent to $2 of after-tax expense of $2. ($2 = $1 / (1 - 0.50)).
51 -$1.00 =-$0.50 / (1 - 0.50).
52 $2.80 = $1.30 + $1.50.
5S If debt were indexed, as in Example 3, the loan would result in a $0.80 revenue
loss because C would receive $2 of income taxable at 10%, while D would receive a
$2 deduction at 50%. This revenue loss is appropriate because it results from the
taxation of real gains and losses actually recognized by taxpayers. See Frederic W.
Hickman, Interes4 Depreciation, and Indexing, 5 VA. TAX REv. 773, 802 (1986). In
Example 3A, the total revenue loss is $3.60 because the full $9 of nominal interest is
taxable to C at 10% while being deductible by D at 50%. The difference of $2.80
between Example 3 and Example 3A is the revenue cost of taxing nominal rather than
real interest.
Taxation ofnominal interest also results in a revenue gain for some debt. Where
the debtor faces a lower tax rate than the creditor, or where interest is not fully
deductible by the debtor, the increase in the creditor's taxable interest income can
produce more revenue than will be lost by the debtor's increased interest deduction.
The aggregate revenue effect of taxing nominal interest can only be ascertained by
considering the relative tax rates faced by debtors and creditors and the extent to
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If C and D are instead transacting in an open market, the actual
interest rate will depend on market forces rather than individual
bargaining strengths. These market forces will determine a
breakeven marginal tax rate, t*, such that both creditors and debtors
facing that marginal rate are indifferent between indexed and
unindexed taxation of debt.M4 Debtors facing a marginal tax rate
above the breakeven rate will benefit from full taxation of nominal
interest, because their higher interest deductions will produce a
greater tax savings than the tax-on-anticipated-inflation component
of interest they will be forced to incur.55 Similarly, creditors
facing a marginal tax rate below the breakeven rate will benefit from
taxation of nominal interest, because their increased tax liability will
be less than the tax-on-anticipated-inflation component of interest
they will receive. Debtors facing a marginal rate below the
breakeven rate and creditors facing a marginal rate above the
which interest expenses are not fully deductible. See infra part I1.0 for a general
discussion of this issue.5 4 This breakeven marginal rate can be calculated from the formula in Example
2A by solving for t. This yields the formula:
=- 1 - [i0 / (ry - rsai)].
Unfortunately, this formula involves variables that are difficult to measure accurately.
As one observer has noted:
A substantial body of empirical research has attempted to measure the
magnitude of the "breakeven" marginal tax rate reflected in the responsive-
ness of interest rates to changes in the rate of inflation. Unfortunately, such
measurement is difficult, in part because the key variable to which interest
rates should on theoretical grounds be responsive-the expected inflation
rate-is by its nature unobservable. Tests of the impact of inflation on
interest rates are thus only as good as the models of expectation formation
in which they are based. The resultant uncertainty about econometric
analyses does not permit a strong conclusion to be drawn.
Bossons, supra note 1, at 956.
5 Under taxation of nominal interest, a debtor will receive an interest deduction
that is i0 / (1 - t) higher than under a system of debt indexation. (i. / (1 - t) = i. +
[i. x t/ (1 - t*)]). This increased deduction will produce a tax savings for the debtor
of i. x t/ (1 - t*), where t is the debtor's marginal tax rate. To compensate creditors
for increased taxable interest income, debtors will also incur an additional tax-on-
anticipated-inflation component of interest of i. x t*/ (1 - t'). See supra note 29 and
accompanying text. For debtors facing a marginal tax rate, t, greater than the
breakeven marginal rate, t°, the tax savings from taxation of nominal interest will
exceed the higher interest costs. For debtors facing a marginal tax rate below the
breakeven rate, the costs will exceed the benefits.
This analysis extends easily to creditors, for whom the benefits and burdens of
taxing nominal interest are simply reversed. Thus, it follows that creditors facing a
marginal tax rate below the breakeven marginal rate will receive a net benefit from
taxation of nominal interest and that creditors facing a rate above the breakeven rate
will experience a net detriment.
INDEX1NG DEBT FOR INFLATION
breakeven rate will be disadvantaged by the absence of index-
ation.56 This example demonstrates the primary economic conse-
quences of our present system of debt taxation.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that in a progressive tax
system, lack of debt indexation results in inequity among debtors
facing different marginal tax rates. Debtors subject to the break-
even tax rate will face the same real pre-tax interest rate as they
would have faced under debt indexation. Debtors subject to a tax
rate below the breakeven rate will face a higher effective interest
rate, while debtors subject to a tax rate above the breakeven rate
will face a lower interest rate. Similarly, lack of indexation results
in inequity among creditors facing different marginal tax rates,
although here it is higher bracket creditors who are disadvantaged
relative to lower bracket creditors. 57  In addition to producing
inequities, rules that overtax one side of a transaction while
undertaxing the other side encourage taxpayers in different brackets
to align themselves in a way that minimizes their combined tax
liability. This self-selection of taxpayers is known as a "tax clientele"
effect.58 With respect to the full taxation of nominal interest, the
overtaxed side is the creditor, and this side will disproportionately
attract low-bracket and zero-bracket taxpayers. The undertaxed
side, in this case, the debtor, will disproportionately attract high-
bracket taxpayers. 59 This alignment of taxpayers results in several
56 See supra note 55.
17 For a full discussion of the inequities resulting from the taxation of nominal
interest, see infra part II.A.
58 See Bossons, supra note 1, at 956 n.23.
59 See 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 194 (1984) [hereinafter TREASURY I].
[I]n a progressive tax system, overstatement of interest expense and income
accentuates the existing incentive for lower tax-bracket taxpayers (including
tax-exempt institutions) to be net creditors and higher tax-bracket taxpayers
to be net borrowers. This so-called "clientele effect" occurs because the tax
savings from interest deductions is greater for high-bracket borrowers than
is the increased tax liability from interest income to low-bracket lenders.
This clientele effect is aggravated during times of high inflation and corre-
sponding high nominal interest rates.
Id. Bossons notes:
Both individual tax avoidance and tax arbitragbe [sic] transactions result in
a reallocation of assets among taxpayers ... so that interest-bearing
financial assets are held to a greater extent than otherwise would be the case
by investors in low tax brackets (e.g., pension funds). Taxpayers in high tax
brackets (wealthy individuals, taxable corporations) are encouraged to hold
tax sheltered assets and to finance a greater portion of their investments by
borrowing.
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economic distortions 0 in addition to producing a revenue loss for
the Treasury.
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II. NoRMATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEBT INDEXATION
A. Efficiency and Equity Considerations
Even without inflation, income from debt is overtaxed relative
to income from other forms of capital. Unlike debt, capital assets,
depreciable assets, and inventories are each subject to preferential
tax rules that reduce their effective rate of taxation.6 2 The extent
of this overtaxation of interest income is increased under inflation-
ary conditions. 63 The existence of these extraneous tax preferenc-
es for other forms of capital can be viewed as a form of ad hoc
indexation, at least to the extent that they are not motivated by
independent policy considerations such as stimulating economic
Bossons, supra note 1, at 950.
60 See infra part II.B.
61 See infra part II.C.
62 See Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 356 ("[A]Imost all forms of capital
income receive some form of special treatment or ad hoc indexing under current
law[,]... [t]he major exception [being] interest income... ."). The effective rate of
taxation of income from capital assets is reduced by the tax deferral advantages of
realization-based taxation, see I.R.C. §§ 1001(c), 1031-1041 (1988), the step-up in basis
at death, see id. § 1014, and the tax-rate ceiling on capital gains, see id. §§ I(h), 1201.
The effective rate of taxation of income from depreciable assets is reduced by the
accelerated depreciation allowances ofModified-ACRS. See id. § 168. At times it has
also been reduced by investment tax credits. See id. §§ 38, 46-48 (1982). The
effective rate of taxation of income from inventories is reduced by the lower of cost
or market valuation, see Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4 (1958), and by LIFO accounting, see
I.R.C. § 472 (1988). See generally Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 353-56
(discussing the various forms of ad hoc indexing under current law).
63 Inflation increases nominal interest income, which is taxed currently at the
taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Although inflation also increases nominal income from
other forms of capital, taxation of this increased income is frequently deferred. See
I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1988) (deferring taxation of gain or loss on property until "sale or
exchange"); id. §§ 1031-1041 (deferring taxation of gain or loss on property under
specified circumstances, even though there has been a "sale or exchange"); id. § 168
(permitting accelerated depreciation); id. § 472 (permitting deferral of inventory
income by allowing LIFO accounting); Treas. Reg. 1.471-4 (1958) (permitting deferral
of inventory income by allowing lower of cost or market accounting). This deferral
is equivalent to taxing the deferred income at a lower tax rate. In the case of capital
assets, taxation may actually occur at a lower rate. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1201 (1988).
Because income from non-debt capital is taxed at a lower effective rate than interest
income, inflation causes a greater incremental tax burden on interest income than on
income from non-debt capital. Cf Bossons, supra note 1, at 951 ("[O1ne of the
primary effects of inflation is to magnify the impact of all of the distortions that occur
in a non-inflationary environment.").
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growth. This does not mean that indexing these assets instead of
providing ad hoc indexation through tax preferences would be
worthless. It does, however, indicate that from the standpoint of
efficiency and horizontal equity, debt is in greater need of index-
ation than other forms of capital."
Under inflationary conditions, and absent any offsetting tax
preferences, unindexed income from all forms of capital is also
overtaxed relative to income from labor.65 Because it receives no
extraneous tax preferences, 6 6 interest income is overtaxed relative
to labor income under conditions of inflation. The degree of this
overtaxation increases with the rate of inflation and, thus, is
theoretically unbounded. At times, the effective tax rate on interest
income has substantially exceeded 100%.67 This horizontal
inequity between taxpayers who derive income from labor and those
who derive income from debt further supports the need for debt
indexation.
68
64 SeeHalperin&Steuerle, supra note 1, at 373 (comments of Mark Perlis)("While
most commentators ... usually advocate indexing as a means of achieving more
neutral taxation of current capital and labor income, the case for indexing is actually
much stronger if consideration is given to seeking neutral tax treatment of capital
income from different types of assets.").
65 Net income, which is subject to taxation, is the amount of gross income that
remains after subtracting the costs associated with producing that income. Capital
income frequently occurs many years after the capital expenditures that helped
produce it. Thus, expenses incurred in producing capital income are often measured
in dollars with significantly greater purchasing power than the current dollars in
which capital income is realized and in which income taxes will be paid. In such
cases, simple netting of gross income and expense, with no adjustment for inflation,
will greatly overstate real capital income. Labor income is not magnified by inflation
in this way. There are relatively few expenses associated with producing labor income
and such expenses generally occur in close temporal proximity to the labor income
they help produce, making any inflationary loss de minimis. See Aaron, supra note
2, at 6; Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 352-53.
66 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
67 The interest rate on short term Treasury bills reached 16.13% in 1981. See
Standard & Poor's Corp., BOND GUIDE, Dec. 1981, at 8. The rate of inflation in 1981,
as measured by the Consumer Price Index, was 10.3%. See Bureau of Lab. Stats., U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Current Labor Statistics, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Dec. 1990, at 59, 96.
The maximum marginal tax rate for individuals at that time was 70%. See I.R.C. § 1
(Supp. IV 1980). Thus, the real after-tax rate of return for a top-bracket individual
holding such a short term Treasury bill was -4.95%. (-4.95% = [16.13 * (1 - 0.70) -
10.3] / (100 + 10.3)). This is equivalent to an effective tax rate of 130.6% on nominal
interest income. (130.6% = [16.13 + 4.95] / 16.13).
68 This argument also applies, albeit to a lesser degree, to income from other
forms of capital. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. It is possible to reject this
claim of inequity by viewing the overtaxation of capital under inflationary conditions
as a desirable source of additional progressivity in the tax system, because the wealthy
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Finally, under inflationary conditions, failure to index debt
favors low-bracket creditors over high-bracket creditors and favors
high-bracket debtors over low-bracket debtors. If debt is not
indexed for inflation, market mechanisms will cause pre-tax interest
rates to increase so that the after-tax interest rate will remain
unchanged for taxpayers facing a specific breakeven marginal tax
rate.69 Net creditors facing a marginal tax rate above this break-
even rate are undercompensated by this market adjustment, as are
net debtors facing a marginal tax rate below this breakeven rate.
Net debtors subject to a marginal tax rate above the breakeven rate
and net creditors subject to a rate below the breakeven rate are
overcompensated. 70 This result is itself inequitable. Additionally,
it encourages high-bracket taxpayers to become net debtors and
low-bracket taxpayers to become net creditors. 71 Implicated in this
basic economic result are several other economic distortions.
Although a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment, brief
mention will be given to the most important of these distortions.
72
First, real after-tax interest rates may be low or even negative for
high-bracket debtors. In order to support as much tax-favored
borrowing as possible, these taxpayers prefer to invest in low-risk,
easily leveraged assets even though such assets may have a much
lower rate of return than other assets that require greater equity.
73
Second, the tax subsidy on borrowing leads to a distorted allocation
receive a disproportionate fraction of capital income. But even if increased
progressivity is desirable, overtaxation of capital income is not necessarily the ideal
means to achieve it. Increased progressivity could also be achieved directly via tax
rate adjustments without creating horizontal inequity between taxpayers receiving
capital income and those receiving labor income. Cf Durst, supra note 37, at 1286
("[A] policy of avoiding indexation of the tax base to enhance progressivity may be
desirable within some range of possible inflation rates, but almost certainly will lead
to excessive tax burdens on income from capital at higher rates.").
Lack of indexation can also be viewed as a form of wealth taxation. Although
income has already been assumed as the proper tax base, see supra note 5 and
accompanying text, lack ofindexation would in any event be an undesirable proxy for
a wealth tax because the variable nature ofinflation would result in widely fluctuating
tax burdens from year to year. See MartinJ. Bailey, Inflationay Distortions and Taxes,
in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 2, at 291, 323 (comments of Peter
Diamond) ("In the end.., we are left with the simple fact that inflation results in a
tax on wealth. A tax on wealth does not bother me, but its random size does.").
69 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
70 See Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 444.
71 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72 For a detailed discussion of the economic effects of taxing nominal interest
income, see Bossons, supra note 1, at 950-59.
71 See id. at 957; Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 358.
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of investment funds between debt and equity.74 In particular,
high-bracket entities such as corporations will engage in more
leveraged financing, which may increase business instability.
75
Third, failure to permit taxpayers to recognize unanticipated infla-
tionary gain or loss on debt for tax purposes increases the economic
risks associated with debt, resulting in reduced levels of savings and
investment.76 Finally, any revenue loss created by lack of debt
indexation must be recaptured by increased tax rates, which in turn
increase the magnitude of these and other distortions throughout
the tax system.
77
B. Revenue Effects
While indexation of capital assets, depreciable assets, or
inventories would necessarily produce a revenue loss, the revenue
effect of debt indexation is not obvious because there are two sides
to every debt transaction. Although debt indexation will reduce
income for net creditors, it will also increase the income of net
debtors by reducing their interest deductions. Thus, the overall
revenue effect of debt indexation will depend on the marginal tax
rates faced by debtors and creditors, the extent to which interest
expenses are less than fully deductible, and the extent to which
some debtors or creditors are exempted from debt indexation on
political or administrative grounds. What follows is a brief
discussion of the probable revenue effect of indexation with respect
to various categories of debt.
Indexation of taxable government debt will be a revenue loser
because most government debtors are tax exempt 78 and will suffer
no tax loss from the reduced interest deduction due to indexation.
Creditors, meanwhile, will receive a tax benefit from excluding part
of the nominal interest income received from the debt. However,
this revenue loss will not occur with respect to government debt
that is held by non-taxable entities such as pension funds. Also, this
revenue loss will be tempered by the fact that partial exclusion of
74 See TREASURY I, supra note 59, at 194.
75 See Bossons, supra note 1, at 950, 957-58 & n.28.76 SeeJohn Bossons, Reply, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 983, 986 (1984); TREASURY I, supra
note 59, at 194.
77 See Bossons, supra note 1, at 950-51.
78 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(1) (1988); see also MICHAEL D. ROSE &JOHN C. CHOMMIE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §11.03 (3d ed. 1988).
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interest income will permit the federal government to pay a lower
interest rate on its debt.
79
Assuming home mortgage debt is indexed for the creditor but
not for the debtor,8 0 indexation of this type of debt will also
produce a revenue loss. The magnitude of this revenue loss will
depend on the marginal tax rates faced by home mortgage creditors.
However, because the decision to exclude home mortgage debt
from indexation is purely political, any resulting revenue loss should
be viewed as a cost of subsidizing home ownership, rather than as
a cost of debt indexation itself. Should Congress choose not to
exempt home mortgage debt from indexation, the revenue effect of
indexing it would depend on the relative tax rates experienced by
home mortgage debtors and creditors. Although a large percentage
of home mortgage debt is held by banks and savings and loan
associations,8 1 these institutions ultimately borrow most of their
funds from depositors.8 2  Assuming debt indexation is done
properly, financial institutions would receive net indexation benefits
only to the extent of their net equity.8 3 To the extent that home
mortgage debt is ultimately financed through funds borrowed by
financial institutions, the revenue effect from indexing home
mortgage indebtedness will depend on depositors' marginal tax
rates as well as those of financial institutions. However, even
assuming that depositors, financial institutions, and other home
mortgage lenders are all relatively high bracket taxpayers, a revenue
loss from indexing home mortgage debt would be unlikely because
most mortgage-holding homeowners are also in relatively high tax
brackets.
Indexation of consumer debt will produce a revenue loss.
Because most consumer interest is considered non-deductible
personal interest,8 4 the revenue pickup from reduced interest
79 This result follows from the fact that, in general, nominal interest rates will be
lower under a system of debt indexation. For a discussion of the revenue effects of
indexing government debt, see Durst, supra note 37, at 1255-56.
80 See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
81 See U.S. LEAGUE OF SAV. INST., 87 SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS SOURCEBOOK 8 (1987)
("Savings institutions are the single major source of residential credit, [a]t year-end
1986 ... [accounting] for 34.3% of all residential loans outstanding.").
82 See id. 6 ("Saving deposits. . represent about 80% of all liabilities . . .
83 One of the major flaws in the Treasury I debt indexation proposal was its
improper treatment of financial institutions and other taxpayers who engaged in
borrowing and lending activities at different interest rates. See infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
8 See I.R.C. § 163 (h) (1988).
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deductions will not fully offset the revenue loss from the interest
income excluded by indexation. Like home mortgage debt, much
consumer credit is provided by financial institutions. Therefore, the
magnitude of the revenue loss from indexing consumer debt will
also depend on the tax rates of financial institutions and their
depositors as well as those of other providers of consumer credit.
Indexation of business debt should produce a revenue gain. On
the creditors' side, business bank debt is subject to approximately
the same revenue analysis as home mortgage debt and consumer
credit. On the debtors' side, businesses are typically high-bracket
taxpayers. 85 Therefore the revenue gain from the partially exclud-
ed interest deduction should exceed the revenue loss from the
corresponding excluded interest income. Corporate bonds should
also produce a revenue pickup. Bond issuers are typically high-
bracket taxpayers, but a significant fraction of corporate bonds are
held by tax exempt entities,8 6 reducing the revenue loss on the
creditors' side.
Although it is difficult to predict the overall revenue effect of
debt indexation, it seems unlikely to be a big revenue loser. 87 The
fact that the federal government is a net debtor will have the largest
negative effect on revenue, although this effect will be tempered by
lower interest rates on federal borrowing. On the other hand,
present overtaxation of interest income relative to income from
other capital means that net creditors, with the exception of
financial institutions, are disproportionately low-bracket taxpayers,
whereas net debtors are disproportionately high-bracket taxpay-
ers.8 8 With respect to these creditors and debtors, debt indexation
will produce a net revenue gain. Overall, any possible revenue loss
from debt indexation should not be of sufficient magnitude to
threaten the political feasibility of debt indexation.
85 At least one recent study found that the effective corporate tax rate has been
approximately 25% since the 1986 Tax Reform Act. See Forrest D. Marovelli & Mark
L. Starcher, Tax Reform is Working According to New CTJ Study on Effective Corporate
Tax Rates, 45 TAX NOTEs 524 (1989).
86 See Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's
Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1319, 1362 n.129 (1991).
87 See Steuerle, supra note 1, at 1007 (presenting 1981 data suggesting debt
indexation would produce a substantial revenue gain under then-existing law).
88 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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C. Administrability Issues
Commentators generally agree that indexation would make the
tax system fairer and reduce economic distortions.8 9 Critics of
indexation have instead tended to focus on the issue of adminis-
trability.90 Many partial indexation schemes have excluded debt
indexation on this basis.9 1 Even Treasury I's proposal, although
providing for debt indexation, made serious departures from
theoretically correct indexation on the grounds of administra-
bility.92 This Comment seeks to demonstrate the feasibility of
accurate debt indexation by considering various general issues in
the implementation of such a scheme, 93 by proposing a suitable
transition rule to deal with the problem of pre-existing debt,94 and
by discussing how indexation could be administered for several
specific classes of debt.95 In general, de minimis rules, new
reporting requirements, and approximate methods of calculation
should make the incremental administrative burden of debt
indexation negligible for most taxpayers. 96 Financial institutions
89 See supra note 1.
90 See supra note 2.
91 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
92 The Treasury I proposal rejected the theoretically correct approach of indexing
debt based on principal balances because it was considered too complex. See
TREASURY I, supra note 59, at 197; Durst, supra note 37, at 1254 n.125;Jonathan B.
Forman, Treasury's Interest Indexing Proposal: Either a Bank or a Net Lender Be, 26 TAX
NOTES 856, 858 (1985). Instead, Treasury I adopted an approximate approach which
based the indexation adjustment on interest rather than principal. Specifically, the
Treasury I scheme assumed that the real pre-tax interest rate (including credit risk
premium) on all debt was 6%. Given the actual rate of inflation, it excluded a
fraction of nominal interest from taxation based on this assumption. For example,
if the rate of inflation were 4%, Treasury I would have excluded 40% of all nominal
interest from taxation (40% = 4% / (4% + 6%)). See TREASURY I, supra note 59, at
194-97.
One of the more serious flaws of the Treasury I proposal was the inappropriate
result it would have produced for financial institutions and other taxpayers who
borrow money and then loan it at a higher interest rate. Such a taxpayer might have
no net debt position, i.e. amount borrowed equals amount owed, and hence no actual
inflationary loss. Yet, the Treasury I scheme would have incorrectly excluded a
fraction of this taxpayer's net interest income, resulting in a potentially large
reduction in taxable income. See Durst, supra note 37, at 1255 n.129 (noting that
"Treasury I's rough method of interest indexation reached inappropriate results for
those taxpayers... engaged in... borrowing and relending money"); Forman, supra,
at 859-60; Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 369-70.
3 See infra part IlI.
94 See infra part IV.
9 See infra part V.
96 See Bossons,supra note 1, at 965-66 (discussing the imposition of new reporting
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should be able to comply with these new reporting requirements at
little expense and with no additional information from taxpayers.
97
The only taxpayers likely to experience any significant administra-
tive burden are those who engage in transactions that already
require sophisticated tax treatment.
The issue of administrability ultimately enters the political arena
entwined with issues of equity, efficiency, and revenue. When these
other factors favor tax reform, Congress has been willing to impose
tremendous complexity on taxpayers. 98  Unfortunately, although
Congress has recognized some of the problems resulting from the
lack of indexation, it has thus far responded with ad hoc solutions
such as the investment interest limitation,99 the at-risk rules, 100
and the passive activity rules. 10 1 These provisions add significant
complexity to the Code without directly confronting the basic
problem of income mismeasurement. 10 2  Furthermore, their
presence reduces the overall effect of this mismeasurement, making
debt indexation less appealing in light of the effects that remain.
An accurate appraisal of the administrative complexity of debt
indexation must also consider the simplifying effect indexation
requirements and de minimis rules and noting that "[flor most individuals and small
businesses, indexation should, if properly implemented, impose virtually no
calculation burden").
9
7 See id. at 966 ("For efficient financial institutions, the cost per account of
modifying a computerized accounting system would be trivial."); Halperin & Steuerle,
supra note 1, at 359 (noting that in many cases, "individuals deal with financial
institutions that have access to the technology to implement indexing without undue
difficulty").
98 Readers skeptical of this proposition are invited to consult the Code provisions
for international taxation. The foreign tax credit limitation rules, see I.R.C. § 904
(1988), and the Subpart F rules, see id. §§ 951-964, make the complexities of debt
indexation appear relatively trivial.
9 The investment interest limitation limits the current deductibility of interest
expense on "indebtedness properly allocable to property held for investment" to the
taxpayer's net investment income. Any interest expense not deductible in one taxable
year as a result of the investment interest limitation is carried forward to the next
taxable year. See id. § 163(d).
100 The at-risk rules limit taxpayers' losses in certain activities to the amount
considered to be at-risk. Amount at-risk is defined to exclude certain forms of
indebtedness. See id. § 465.
101 The passive activity rules limit the deductibility of interest allocable to passive
activities by denying the deductibility of passive activity losses to the extent that they
exceed passive activity income. See id. § 469.
102 SeeJerome Kurtz, Comments on "IndexingforIn/lation and the Interest Deduction",
30 WAYNE L. REV. 969,970 (1984) (noting that the investment interest limitation only
partially addresses the problem presented by the failure to tax inflationary gains and
losses properly).
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would have on tax computation under existing law. Many taxpayers
who are subject to the investment interest limitation, at-risk rules,
and passive activity rules would find these provisions inapplicable
under debt indexation due to their reduced interest deductions.
III. GENERAL ISSUES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEBT INDEXATION
A. Partial Versus Comprehensive Indexation
A comprehensive solution to the inflation-induced inequities
and distortions existing under current law requires indexation of
capital assets, depreciable assets, and inventories, as well as
indebtedness.10 3 Although there is widespread agreement on the
desirability of such comprehensive indexation, substantial disagree-
ment exists as to its administrability. 10 4 While some proposals
advocate comprehensive indexation,10 5 others argue that compre-
hensive indexation is impracticable, and advance, instead, a partial
scheme.1 6 However, because of the tax arbitrage possibilities
presented by partial indexation,10 7 tax base indexation may be an
area where a workable partial solution is more difficult than a
comprehensive one.
108
Because of the political and administrative difficulties involved
in adopting any form of indexation, the initial attempt to index the
tax base for inflation may be a partial one.109 The usual assump-
tion made by proponents of partial indexation is that debt index-
ation would present too many administrative difficulties and,
therefore, should be excluded from any indexation scheme. Other
portions of this Comment attempt to demonstrate that debt
103 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., TREASURY I, supra note 59, at 151-72, 177-200 (presenting Treasury
Department proposals to index debt, capital assets, depreciation allowances, and
inventories).
106 See, e.g., Durst, supra note 37, at 1221 (proposing elective indexation of capital
assets and depreciation allowances, and limiting indexation of debt-financed assets by
requiring partial exclusion of interest expenses by those who elect to index).107 See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
108 See Bossons, supra note 1, at 961 ("[T]he key to easy implementation [of any
form of tax base indexation] is comprehensive implementation for all assets and
debts. Ifimplementation is restricted in any way, it immediately becomes substantial-
ly more complex.").
109 Cf. id. at 966-67 ("[B]ecause of the high economic cost of the inflation induced
tax distortions, it may be worthwhile to introduce limited tax indexation initiatives
before proceeding to attempt to implement more comprehensive reform.").
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indexation should not be rejected on administrative grounds.110
Additionally, indexing capital assets, depreciation allowances, or
inventories without indexing debt would exacerbate existing
arbitrage opportunities for purchasers of debt-financed assets.
111
Any partial scheme that excluded debt indexation would need some
ad hoc solution to this enhanced opportunity for arbitrage.
112
Even if indexing debt does involve some additional administrative
complexity, indexing debt in conjunction with other assets would
not involve significantly more complexity than implementation of
an adequate ad hoc solution to this enhanced opportunity for tax
arbitrage.113 Administrative issues aside, because the taxation of
capital assets, depreciable assets, and inventories each include some
110 See infra parts IV & V.
II See Bossons, supra note 1, at 967; Durst, supra note 37, at 1276-77; New York
State Bar Ass'n, Report on Inflation Adjustments to the Basis of Capital Assets, 48 TAX
NoTEs 759, 762 (1990) [hereinafter NYSBA Report].
112 Partial indexation would encourage taxpayers to borrow money to purchase
indexed assets. Nominal interest expense on the borrowed funds would be fully
deductible while nominal income on the indexed assets would be partially excluded
from taxation. This would enable taxpayers to create a net tax loss without suffering
any true economic loss.
113 The capital asset indexation provision passed by the House of Representatives
as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (but not included in the
final legislation) attempted to limit debt arbitrage opportunities by excluding all gain
from the sale or disposition of an indexed asset from § 163(d) investment income, see
I.R.C. § 163(d) (1988), and by allowing indexation only in computing gain. See H.R.
3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 11961 (1989). The investment income limitation is
problematic because it does not attack debt arbitrage by taxpayers whose interest
expense is treated as business or passive-activity interest or by taxpayers who have
enough investment income from other sources to offset all of their investment
interest expense. The limitation of indexation to transactions involving gain would
produce horizontal inequities as some taxpayers suffering inflationary losses on non-
debt-financed assets would be denied an indexation adjustment. It would also
enhance the lock-in effect. See NYSBA Report, supra note 111, at 764. The NYSBA
Report noted that debt tracing or debt allocation rules could prevent debt arbitrage
but rejected such rules as too complex. See id. at 764-65; see also Bossons, supra note
1, at 946 ("In some respects, a limited indexation scheme [excluding debt indexation]
is harder to implement than a comprehensive approach, primarily because of the
additional requirements for debt tracing that arise from the non-neutralities inherent
in a limited scheme.").
Another proposal intended to limit tax arbitrage by holders of debt-financed
assets would permit taxpayers to elect indexation of depreciation allowances and
capital gains only if they agreed to forgo a fraction of their interest deductions. See
Durst, supra note 37, at 1277-84. This approach has the benefit of making the
inflation-related adjustment to interest deductions elective, eliminating any additional
complexity for taxpayers who elected not to index their depreciation allowances and
capital assets. However, it offers no administrative advantage over true debt
indexation for taxpayers who do elect to index depreciation allowances and capital
assets.
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form of tax preference that partially offsets the failure to index
these assets, lack of debt indexation creates the greatest inequities
and distortions, and is, therefore, most in need of remediation
11 4
For these reasons, debt indexation should be included in any partial
indexation scheme.
B. Recognition of the Inflation Adjustment
The timing of recognition of the inflation adjustment is a vital
issue in the implementation of any scheme of debt indexation. One
possibility is to adjust the basis of debt annually by the amount of
any inflationary gain or loss. This scheme would defer recognition
of the inflation adjustment until other gain or loss on the debt is
recognized through sale, exchange, or retirement. The alternative
is to recognize inflationary gain and loss currently by reducing the
amount of interest income or expense recognized over the term of
the debt. Our present treatment of gain and loss in the market
value of debt is a hybrid of current and deferred taxation. The
basis-adjustment approach for recognizing inflationary gain and loss
is analogous to the deferred taxation of unanticipated gain or loss
in the market value of debt imposed by the realization require-
ment. 115 The interest-adjustment approach is analogous to the
current accrual-type taxation applied to most forms of anticipated
gain or loss in the market value of debt.
11 6
Over the life of a debt, the cumulative inflation adjustment
should be based on actual inflation just as overall taxation of
income from a debt is based on actual rather than anticipated gain
or loss.'1 7 During the term of a debt, however, the Code general-
114 See supra parts II.A & II.B.
115 See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (1988).
116 See, e.g., id. §§ 163(e), 1271-1275 (imposing approximate accrual taxation on
anticipated gain or loss on original issue discount obligations); id. § 171 (permitting
taxpayers to elect amortization of certain bond premiums); id. § 1286 (imposing
original issue discount rules on stripped bonds). In effect, these provisions each
permit or require anticipated gain or loss on debt to be recognized annually. One
case in which accrual of anticipated gain is not imposed is market discount bonds.
Instead of requiring accrual, the Code attacks the problem of tax deferral by partially
deferring direct interest expenses incurred to carry a market discount bond. See id.
§ 1277.
117 See Bossons, supra note 76, at 986-88. But see MichaelJ. McIntyre, Comments
on "Indexing for Inflation and the Interest Deduction", 30 WAYNE L. REv. 973, 980-81
(1984) (claiming that indexation should adjust for anticipated inflation but not for
unanticipated inflation).
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ly bases taxation on expected income. 118 Consistency with this
general principle would support current realization of an adjust-
ment for anticipated inflation and deferral of any adjustment for
unanticipated inflation. There are, however, two reasons that
anticipated and unanticipated inflation should not be accounted for
separately. First, to calculate an inflation adjustment based on
anticipated inflation, it would be necessary to know the anticipated
rate of inflation underlying each debt. This is clearly infeasi-
ble, l ' although some standard rate of anticipated inflation might
be assumed to underlie all debt without too much loss of accuracy.
Second, treating anticipated and unanticipated inflation differently
would unnecessarily increase complexity by requiring both annual
interest adjustments and cumulative basis adjustments upon
realization.
1 20
Assuming a single inflation adjustment will be made based on
actual inflation, a choice must still be made between basis-adjust-
ment and interest-adjustment. There are several arguments that
favor the use of an interest-adjustment over a basis-adjustment.
First, it is the interest payment that contains an anticipated-inflation
component to compensate the creditor for the inflationary loss in
the real value of his principal. Regardless of when the interest
payment actually occurs, anticipated interest income and expense
are generally recognized annually.121 Indexing interest will more
closely reflect true economic income for each tax period by
offsetting the anticipated-inflation component of interest as it is
recognized. 122 Indexing basis rather than interest would result in
large, artificial fluctuations in income as inflation adjustments
accrued over a long period are recognized in a single year. Second,
118 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
119 See Bossons, supra note 76, at 988; Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 367-
68; Hickman, supra note 53, at 801.
120 See Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 366-68.
121 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
122 Theoretically, the distinction between assets that should be indexed annually
and those that should be indexed only upon a normal recognition event should be
based on the distinction between assets that rise in value with inflation and assets that
do not. This distinction is not achieved simply by differentiating between non-debt
and debt. Nonconvertible, nonparticipating preferred stock is an example of a non-
debt asset whose value does not increase with inflation, while convertible bonds and
bonds with equity kickers are good examples of debt that do appreciate with inflation.
See Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 364-66. Some arbitrariness in distinguishing
between assets that should be indexed currently and those whose indexation
adjustment should be deferred is inevitable under a realization-based system.
Furthermore, this problem is not unique to indexation. See id. at 362-64.
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basis-adjustment would impose large, one-time tax liabilities on
debtors as inflation adjustments cumulated over the term of a debt
are finally recognized upon disposition. Unlike the large tax
liabilities often recognized on the sale of capital assets, which can
usually be satisfied with sale proceeds, these indexation liabilities
would become due at the same time that debtors are supposed to
satisfy their debt liabilities. Insolvent debtors would be unable to
satisfy their indexation-based tax liabilities, 123 while their credi-
tors would presumably still be permitted tax deductions for their
corresponding inflationary losses. This would result in an unneces-
sary revenue loss. Finally, considering a broad range of debt,
interest-adjustment would be easier to administer. Basis-adjustment
would be somewhat simpler where the principal balance remains
constant over the duration of a debt because the entire inflation
adjustment could be calculated once, upon realization, rather than
annually. On the other hand, interest-adjustment is simpler where
principal is paid over the term of a debt, as with self-amortizing
loans or lines of credit. Basis-adjustment would require the
taxpayer to account separately for indexed basis and unpaid
principal. Under the interest-adjustment approach, basis is simply
equal unpaid principal for most debt.
In addition to these arguments supporting the use of an interest-
adjustment, the usual reasons supporting realization-based taxation
are diminished or nonexistent in the context of debt indexation.
The primary reason that changes in the market value of many assets
are not recognized until realization is that annual recognition would
create problems of valuation and liquidity.124 Valuation problems
would arise because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate assess-
ments of the worth of an asset in the absence of a market transac-
tion. Liquidity problems would arise because holders of indivisible
assets would be taxed on unrealized gains and might, therefore, be
forced to sell their assets prematurely to meet this tax liability.
Similarly, holders of divisible assets might be forced to incur large
transaction costs in subdividing their assets for partial sale.
Although these asset-holders might be able to satisfy their tax
123 Although § 6331 of the Code, see I.R.C. § 6331 (1988), authorizes the Secretary
to collect tax deficiencies by levy, the available property may be exempt from levy
under § 6334, see id. § 6334, or may be of insufficient value to satisfy the tax liability.
124 See David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1118 (1986); Mark L. Louie, Note, Realizing
Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34
STAN. L. REV. 857, 865-67 (1982).
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liabilities by borrowing money secured by their appreciated assets,
many would not have access to low-cost credit.
In the context of debt indexation, neither of these problems
strongly support deferral of the inflation adjustment.12 5 Under
an interest-adjustment approach, valuation will not present a
problem because the inflation adjustment will be calculated from
the taxpayer's basis rather than from the market value of debt
1 26
and no annual valuation will be required. Liquidity is also less
problematic in the context of debt indexation than with other
capital assets. To the extent that some debtors face increased tax
liabilities as the result of recognizing inflation adjustments annually,
these debtors can presumably issue additional debt to finance this
tax liability. They should have no difficulty securing this additional
debt because the very inflation that created the need for additional
borrowing will also have reduced the real value of their pre-existing
debt.
Assuming that the choice is made to adjust interest annually on
the basis of actual inflation, an administrative problem may arise if
the inflation adjustment exceeds the amount of nominal interest.
In this case, it is clear that the debtor should not recognize any
interest expense, and the creditor should not recognize any interest
income. The best treatment of the excess inflation adjustment
above nominal interest is less obvious. Theoretically, the creditor
could simply recognize a current loss in the amount of the excess
inflation adjustment, with the debtor recognizing a corresponding
gain. This scheme, however, would require revisions in interest
reporting requirements and special rules making the debtor's
recognition of gain from excess inflation mandatory.127  An
alternative rule would require any excess inflation adjustment to be
carried forward to later years, with any unused adjustment to be
recognized upon disposition or termination of the debt.
125 See T. Nicolaus Tideman & Donald P. Tucker, The Tax Treatment of Business
Profits under Inflationay Conditions, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 2,
at 33,58 (remarking that "[t]he ... major arguments for deferring the tax on capital
gains until realization do not apply to inflation-related gains on monetary liabilities").
126 See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
127 See McIntyre, supra note 117, at 981 (rejecting this approach on the grounds
that "taxpayers cannot be expected to report negative deductions").
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C. Measuring Inflation
Any attempt to index the tax system for the effects of inflation
must decide how to measure inflation. Inflation affects the tax
system in two ways. First, inflation changes the rate structure of the
income tax by changing the real value of all nominal dollar amounts
in the Code. 128 Many of these amounts are already indexed to
increases in the Consumer Price Index.129  Second, inflation
distorts the tax base by artificially increasing taxpayers' nominal
income.13 0 This tax base distortion affects not only debt, but also
capital assets, depreciation allowances, and inventories.13 1 At
present, none of these areas are explicitly indexed and theoretically,
different measures of inflation could be adopted for indexing each
of them.13 2 However, using the same index for each of these
areas would be desirable both on grounds of administrative ease and
maintenance of neutrality in the taxation of debt-financed assets
between inflationary and non-inflationary conditions.
1 33
Discussion of the merits of using various measures of inflation
is beyond the scope of this Comment. Assuming the use of some
broad-based inflation index, however, the actual choice of index is
of limited significance.13 4 Because the Consumer Price Index is
already used to index nominal dollar figures throughout the Code,
it is a likely candidate for debt indexation. In any event, the
implementation of tax base indexation, whether for debt or for
other assets, should not be rejected on the basis of measurement
problems.
13 5
128 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., I.R.C. § I(f) (1988) (indexing tax brackets); id. § 32(i) (indexing earned
income credit); id. § 41(e)(5) (indexing research and development credit); id.
§ 63(c)(4) (indexing standard deduction and additional deduction for the blind and
aged); id. § 151(d)(4) (West Supp. 1991) (indexing personal exemption amount and
phaseout threshold).
1s0 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
131 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
132 See Aaron, supra note 2, at 15-16. Furthermore, the choice of an inflation
index for tax base indexation need not be the same as that made for rate structure
indexation. See Edward F. Denison, Price Series for Indexing the Income Tax System, in
INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 2, at 233, 235-36 ("The measurement of
income in current prices when inflation occurs [i.e. tax base indexation] is unrelated
to [tax bracket] indexing, and the conclusions [about the appropriate choice of index]
should not be extended to it.").
133 See Aaron, supra note 2, at 14-15.
134 See Bossons, supra note 1, at 960 n.31.
135 Assuming that income is chosen as a tax base because it is supposed to
represent welfare or ability to pay, it is clear that income measured in monetary terms
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D. Distinguishing Debt from Other Assets and Liabilities
One threat to the efficacy of debt indexation is the possibility
that debtors might be able to circumvent the reduced interest
deductions resulting from debt indexation by restructuring their
loan transactions as rental transactions. i3 6 In an efficient market,
the rental payment for a piece of property will approximate the
interest expense on debt sufficient to purchase that property plus
the anticipated appreciation or depreciation in property value over
the term of the lease.137 Rather than debt-financing a purchase,
a high-bracket taxpayer would realize a tax savings through lease-
financing.138 His rental payment would then be fully deductible,
whereas, in the case of debt financing, his interest expense would
have been reduced by indexation.
If debt indexation is undertaken as part of a comprehensive plan
that also includes the indexation of capital assets and depreciation
allowances, the extent of this lease financing problem will be greatly
reduced. In this case, the advantage obtained by renting will be
offset by the disadvantage of not indexing the rental property's
basis.13 9 Even absent comprehensive tax base indexation, prefer-
ential tax treatment of capital and depreciable assets will function
as a form of ad hoc indexation that will reduce the value of lease-
financing for high-bracket taxpayers. If this ad hoc indexation were
is not a perfect proxy for individual welfare. Cf Denison, supra note 132, at 236-37
(noting that tax law ignores geographical price differences even though they are
related to welfare). This same problem also prevents any single inflation index from
being a perfect measure of the effect of inflation on all taxpayers. The existence of
this problem has not prevented the taxation of income in nominal monetary terms;
likewise, it should not prevent tax base indexation. Cf. Bossons, supra note 1, at 960-
61 n.31 ("The differences resulting from the choice of index are of second-order
importance compared to the effect of using any general price index to correct taxable
income."). But see NYSBA Report, supra note 111, at 773 (citing the fact that "the use
of any particular inflation index will offer inexact relief to the owner of any particular
asset" as a theoretical weakness of indexation proposals); Lorence L. Bravenec &
Anthony P. Curatola, Indexing the Federal Tax Systemfor Inflation, 28 TAx NOTES 457,
458 (1985) (arguing that use of the Consumer Price Index "will misstate the effect of
inflation on business and investment assets").
136 See McIntyre, supra note 117, at 979-80.137 See Bossons, supra note 76, at 984. The costs of risk reallocation and tax
com lications will cause rental prices to diverge somewhat from this ideal.
m The lessor would presumably be a low-bracket taxpayer who purchased the
leased asset using debt financing, for whom the reduced interest deduction would be
much less costly.
139 See McIntyre, supra note 117, at 980 (discussing the offsetting effects of debt
indexation and indexation of depreciation allowances).
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considered insufficient, it might be necessary to include lease
financing as a form of indexable debt.
1 40
One secondary benefit of debt indexation is that it will reduce
the importance of the distinction between corporate debt and
equity. Because interest payments are fully deductible and dividend
payments are not deductible at all, corporations are strongly
encouraged to characterize capital contributions as debt rather than
equity. 141 This has resulted in substantial litigation as the Inter-
nal Revenue Service has sought to challenge taxpayers' characteriza-
tions. In 1969, Congress granted the Treasury authority to
promulgate regulations governing the determination of whether an
interest in a corporation would be treated as debt or equity.
142
But more than twenty years later, final regulations have yet to be
issued. Because debt indexation will decrease the magnitude of the
corporate interest deduction, 143 it will reduce the corporate
incentive to recharacterize capital contributions as debt.
IV. TRANSITION RULES
Even tax law revisions that apply new rules only after the date
of enactment can have major retroactive effects. These effects
usually consist of market-driven changes in the value of assets and
liabilities that were acquired before the revision, under the
expectation that they would be taxed based on existing law.
144
140 See Bossons, supra note 76, at 985. The lease/loan distinction presents other
tax problems even in the absence of inflation. In particular, the typical level-rent
lease includes a hidden loan element. Present taxation of nominal rental income and
expense defers the lessee's income and the lessor's deductions. Proper taxation of
leases requires separating rental payments into their depreciation and interest compo-
nents. See George Mundstock, The Mistaxation of Rent: Eliminating the Lease/Loan
Distinction, 53 TAX NOTES 353, 353 (1991). Applying an indexation adjustment to
reduce the deductibility of the interest component of rental payments would
eliminate any additional lease-financing incentive created by debt indexation. See,
Bossons, supra note 76, at 986 (advocating an indexation adjustment for rental
payments calculated by multiplying the inflation rate by the capitalized value of all
future lease payments).
141 See William T. Plumb,Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Coiporate Debt:
A CriticalAnalysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369,371 (1971) (noting that "the tax
consequences of debt are generally more favorable than those of stock").
142 See I.R.C. § 385 (1988).
14s Indexing will also decrease the interest income of holders of corporate debt.
This benefit could potentially offset the disadvantage of indexing to the corporation.
However, assuming holders of corporate debt tend to face lower tax rates than
corporate lenders, see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text, this offset would only
be partial.
144 See MichaelJ. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
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The major economic consequence of adopting debt indexation
would be to lower the nominal interest rate on new debt. The
interest rate would be lowered because it would no longer need to
compensate the creditor for his tax liability on the anticipated-
inflation component of his interest income. 145 If debt indexation
were applied to all debt outstanding after the date of enactment, the
present value of existing, fixed-rate debt would increase as the
effective yield on this pre-existing debt declined to match that of
new debt. As with any drop in market interest rates, pre-existing,
long-term debt would experience the greatest increase in value,
while short-term debt would experience smaller increases.
These price changes in the value of pre-existing fixed-rate debt
would result in windfall gains for creditors and windfall losses for
debtors. 146 Such windfalls are generally considered unfair and
inefficient, and special transition rules are frequently adopted to
limit windfall gains and losses resulting from tax law revisions.
147
The following example demonstrates the windfall effects of
implementing debt indexation in the absence of any transition
scheme for pre-existing fixed-rate debt.
Example 4: C agrees to lend D the sum of $100.00 for a period of
one year. C and D both anticipate an inflation rate of 5%. C is
willing to accept, and D is willing to pay, an anticipated, real pre-
tax interest rate of 2%. C anticipates facing a marginal tax rate of
10%, and D anticipates facing a marginal tax rate of 50%. C and
D agree on a nominal interest rate of 9%. Debt indexation is then
enacted without any transition rule for pre-existing debt. The
actual inflation rate for the period of the loan is 5%.
As previously discussed, although C and D were willing to
contract for a real pre-tax interest rate of 2%, without debt
indexation they were able to agree upon a nominal interest rate of
9%, which would yield C a real pre-tax interest rate of 3.44%, and
would charge D a real pre-tax interest rate of _1%.148 If this debt
is then subjected to an inflation adjustment based on a 5% rate of
actual inflation, $5.00 of the $9.00 nominal interest will be excluded
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 49-52 (1977).
145 Compare the interest rate formula under debt indexation, supra text
accompanying note 21, with the formula under full taxation of nominal interest
income, supra text accompanying note 29.
146 See Bossons, supra note 1, at 960-61.
147 See generally Graetz, supra note 144, at 63-87 (discussing efficiency and fairness
issues relating to choice of transition rules).
148 See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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from taxation. C will be left with real pre-tax income of $4.00, for
a real pre-tax yield of 4%. D will receive a tax deduction of $4.00,
resulting in a real pre-tax interest rate of 4%. Indexing debt will
force C and D to face the same pre-tax interest rate, eliminating the
taxpayer benefit usually created by the taxation of full nominal
interest.149 Unfortunately for D, this interest rate is 4% rather
than the 2% that C and D were originally willing to accept.
Indexation has produced a windfall gain for C-an increase in his
effective, pre-tax interest rate from 3.44% to 4%. Moreover,
indexation has produced an even larger windfall loss for D-an
increase in his effective, pre-tax interest rate from -1% to 4%.150
The primary function of a transition rule for debt indexation is
to eliminate these windfall gains and losses on pre-existing, fixed-
rate debt. The success of any particular transition scheme must be
measured, at least in part, by its ability to minimize these windfalls.
There is a second important criterion, however, that any successful
transition rule for debt indexation must also satisfy. The goal of
any tax law revision is, very simply, to revise the law. Under the
present system of nominal taxation of debt, parties can face real
pre-tax interest rates that vary substantially from one another, and
from the interest rate they would have agreed upon had they known
that debt indexation would be in effect.1 5 1 The primary goal of
debt indexation is to force all taxpayers to face the same real pre-tax
interest rate, regardless of their marginal tax bracket. A successful
transition scheme must not unduly impede this goal by delaying or
diminishing the desirable effects of debt indexation. Thus, a
successful transition rule must also force taxpayers to face the same
real pre-tax interest rate on pre-existing debt that they would have
faced had they known that debt indexation would be enacted and
applied to their debt.
152
149 See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
150 Arguably, the increase in the effective interest rate from -1.00% to 2.00% is not
a windfall loss, because D was willing to face a pre-tax interest rate of 2.00%. D faced
a rate of-1.00% due only to the lack of debt indexation. Thus, a successful transition
rule should not require D to face an interest rate above 2.00%, but it need not permit
him to face an interest rate below 2.00%.
151 In Example 4, C faced a real, pre-tax interest rate of 3.44%, while D's rate was -
1.00%. Had the parties correctly anticipated that their debt would be indexed for
inflation, they would have agreed to a rate of 2.00%. See supra note 148 and
accompanying text.
152 Thus, in Example 4, an ideal transition rule would require both C and D to
face effective, pre-tax interest rates of 2%, because this is the rate they would have
agreed upon had debt indexation been in effect at the time the debt was incurred.
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Tax law revisions employ a variety of different transition
schemes. In a seminal article on legal transitions, Professor Graetz
discusses several general types of transition rules. 153 This Com-
ment will consider the applicability of the most important of these
categories-delayed effective dates, phased-in effective dates,
grandfathered effective dates, and holder-only grandfathered
effective dates-to the problem of designing a transition rule for
debt indexation. As will be seen, each of these rules fails to satisfy
one or more of the criteria required of a successful transition
scheme, namely, eliminating windfall gains and losses, and eliminat-
ing the undesirable effects of nominal taxation of debt.
Under a delayed effective date rule, a debt indexation provision
would be enacted but would only become operative some number
of years in the future. Such a rule would eliminate price changes in
short-term debt that expired before the effective date, and would
reduce price changes in longer-term debt. Assuming a typical delay
of one or two years, however, the price effect of indexation on long-
term debt would not be substantially reduced.154 Furthermore,
delaying the effective date would entail forgoing the benefits of debt
indexation for another few years.
Similar to the delayed effective date is the piased-in effective
date. Rather than making debt indexation fully effective in a single
year, under a phased-in effective date there would be a period of
years during which the indexation adjustment would be made
effective in increasingly larger percentages. 155  Unfortunately,
phased-in effective dates suffer from the same flaws as delayed
effective dates-they do not fully eliminate price changes, because
some portion of indexation on pre-existing long-term debt is
phased-in, and they partially forgo the benefits of debt indexation
for a period beyond the enactment date.
156
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
15?See generally Graetz, supra note 144, at 52-63 (describing various types of
effective date provisions and discussing their economic effects).
154 To significantly reduce the price effect of indexation on long-term debt, the
delay would have to approach the term of such debt, which is frequently as long as
30 years. If debt indexation is considered a desirable reform, however, then any
transition rule that would delay its implementation for such a length of time must be
rejected.
155 For a time, the Treasury intended to delay the effective date of its debt
indexation proposal from 1985 until 1989 and to phase it in at a rate of 10% per year.
See Treasury Announces Modified Effective Dates and Transition Rules for Tax Reform
Proposals, 26 TAX NOTES 866 (1985).
156 On the other hand, both delayed and phased-in effective dates do avoid the
V
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Under a grandfathered effective date rule, all debt existing at
the enactment date would be permanently exempted from index-
ation, while all new debt would be fully subject to indexation. Such
a rule might appear to eliminate all undesirable price changes. This
view ignores the fact that debtors tend to be in a higher marginal
tax bracket than creditors.1 57 As the supply of old debt dwindles,
the lowest-bracket creditors and the highest-bracket debtors would
become willing to pay an increasing premium for any remaining
unindexed debt and would acquire such debt from taxpayers closer
to the breakeven marginal rate. Although it is unclear exactly how
this premium would be split between buyers and sellers of grand-
fathered debt, grandfathering would produce windfall gains for
holders of existing debt able to sell such debt at a premium.
158
One way to avoid these windfalls would be to adopt a "holder-only"
grandfathering rule. Under such a rule, pre-existing debt would be
exempt from indexation only if it were possessed by the same
taxpayer who held it as of the enactment date. Although holder-
only grandfathering would eliminate price changes in pre-existing
need to develop rules to distinguish pre-existing debt from new debt-rules that could
potentially complicate the implementation of any transition scheme for debt
indexation. For this reasonJohn Bossons advocates an allowance rule which is quite
similar to a phased-in effective date rule. Under an allowance rule, taxpayers would
be permitted a full deduction of nominal interest on an amount of debt not
exceeding an "allowed debt limit." This limit would be set to the amount of the
taxpayer's outstanding debt at the culmination of debt indexation, and would be
phased out at a rate of 5% per annum. See Bossons, supra note 1, at 962. Likewise,
interest-bearing assets would be subject to indexation only to the extent that they
exceed this allowed debt limit. See id. at 963.
Bossons' approach not only avoids the need to develop rules distinguishing pre-
existing debt from new debt but also "has the advantage of making the tax system
[relatively] neutral in its impact on most decisions regarding the use of debt." Id. at
962. This would occur because "[flor most taxpayers, the debt financing decision
would involve choices between alternative levels of debt which were all in excess of
the allowable debt limit," meaning that most new financing decisions would involve
the choice of indexed rather than unindexed debt. Id. Neither the delayed effective
date rule nor the phased-in effective date rule make the tax system neutral in this
way. Bossons' approach, however, would still result in price changes for pre-existing
debt and would perpetuate some of the distortions associated with unindexed
treatment of debt for years to come. See id. at 966 (noting that the disadvantage in
the allowance approach is that it will still "provide a tax incentive to maintain debt/
equity ratios at levels which in some cases may be higher than they would be in a fully
indexed world" because "the existing tax incentive to use debt financing.., is only
eliminated to the extent to which normal debt levels would be above ... the 'old'
debt limit").
157 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
158 Cf Graetz, supra note 144, at 61 (describing similar effect where tax exemption
on certain bonds is eliminated but exemption on pre-existing bonds is grandfathered).
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debt, it would do so at the cost of liquidity. More importantly, both
normal and holder-only grandfathering would perpetuate some of
the detrimental effects of non-indexation until all pre-existing debt
had expired. Under either form of grandfathering, both high-
bracket debtors and low-bracket creditors would be able to enjoy
the tax advantages of pre-existing, unindexed debt for many years
beyond the enactment of indexation. Such a result is incompatible
with the criterion that the beneficial effects of indexation should
not be unduly delayed.
Because none of these common transition schemes seems
completely adequate, it is time to consider whether a more
satisfactory transition rule can be developed. As previously
discussed, an ideal transition rule would require debtors and
creditors to face the same effective pre-tax interest rate regardless
of their marginal tax brackets, without creating the windfall gains
and losses that would result from fully indexing pre-existing fixed-
rate debt.159 Without debt indexation, market interest rates will
include a component, ix, that represents the tax on the anticipated
inflation component of interest for a taxpayer at some breakeven
marginal rate.160  An ideal transition rule would index pre-
existing fixed-rate debt but would give the debtor a tax credit equal
to it,, times his indexable basis and give the debtor a tax surcharge
in the same amount. Such a rule would effectively retransfer the
tax-on-anticipated-inflation component of interest on pre-existing
debt from the creditor back to the debtor, this component no
longer being necessary where debt is indexed for inflation. After
this credit/surcharge has been applied, creditor and debtor will still
be facing the same effective, pre-tax interest rate but this rate will
now equal the rate that they would have agreed upon had they
known that their debt would be indexed. In order to achieve the
correct adjustment, this tax-on-anticipated-inflation component,
although transferred from the debtor to the creditor as interest,
should be neither deductible nor includable in income, because it
is ultimately retransferred via this tax credit/surcharge. This
treatment could be accomplished by including the amount of the tax
credit/surcharge as part of the inflation adjustment to be excluded
in calculating taxable interest from nominal interest.161  The
159 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
160 i. = i. x ° / [1 - t], where i6 is the anticipated rate of inflation and t* is the
breakeven marginal tax rate. See supra notes 29 & 54 and accompanying text.
161 This proposed rule is conceptually similar to an approach Graetz terms the
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following example demonstrates the mechanics of this proposed
transition rule, assuming anticipated inflation of 5% and a break-
even marginal tax rate of 25%.
Example 4A: The facts are identical to those in Example 4, except
that the proposed transition scheme applies to the pre-existing
fixed-rate debt between C and D.
As a result of the proposed transition rule, C is subject to a tax
surcharge of 1.67%162 on his indexable basis of $100.00. Of the
$9.00 of nominal interest income, $5.00 compensates C for actual
inflation, and $1.67 is paid as a tax surcharge. C therefore receives
a real pre-tax return of $2.33, for a real pre-tax yield of 2.33%. D
likewise has a real pre-tax expense of $2.33, for a real pre-tax
interest rate of 2.33%. This result is much closer to the 2% real
interest rate to which the parties would have agreed had they known
that their debt would be subject to indexation.
163
This proposed rule does present some administrative difficulties.
The variable it, is dependent on the breakeven marginal tax rate for
debt and the anticipated rate of inflation.164 One problem is that
both the breakeven marginal tax rate and the anticipated rate of
inflation have varied over time. This difficulty could be eliminated
by requiring the percentage of the tax credit/surcharge to be
obtained from a historical table. This table could be constructed
from breakeven tax rates and anticipated inflation rates existing
when the debt was originally incurred. Measurement problems
involved in determining these variables, however, would make them
imprecise, so such a scheme would probably be considered too
complex to justify the limited increase in accuracy it would
produce.
165
"phased-out grandfather rule." See Graetz, supra note 144, at 63 n.53.
162 0.0167 = 0.05 x 0.25 / (1 - 0.25). See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
163 If the rate of anticipated inflation and the breakeven marginal tax rate used
to calculate the tax credit/surcharge rate exactly equal the anticipated inflation rate
and breakeven marginal tax rate underlying the particular loan, then the real pre-tax
interest rate will be corrected to exactly the rate that the parties would have agreed
to had they known that their debt would be subject to indexation.
164 See supra note 159.
165 To the extent that tax rates and the rate of anticipated inflation have declined
since the late 1970s and early 1980s, the average magnitude of the transition windfalls
produced by assuming a single breakeven tax rate and anticipated rate of inflation for
all debt will also be reduced. Assuming that the existence of transition windfalls is
one impediment to the adoption of debt indexation, it would be better to implement
debt indexation now rather than in a future climate of higher inflation and increased
tax rates.
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A second difficulty arises from the fact that both the breakeven
tax rate and the rate of anticipated inflation are market variables.
The interest rate on any particular debt may have been based on the
anticipated marginal tax rates of a specific creditor and debtor and
on the rate of inflation anticipated by these parties. Any transition
scheme based on these subjective values would clearly be unadminis-
trable, so it is necessary to assume that these subjective values are
reasonably close to the corresponding market variables. This
assumption is plausible because an efficient debt market would
preclude either the creditor or the debtor from entering into any
transaction based on subjective values that differed substantially
from corresponding market variables.
Given these considerations, a hypothetical transition rule might
assume anticipated inflation of 5% and a breakeven marginal tax
rate of 25%, resulting in a 1.67% credit/surcharge rate.1 66 Legis-
lation enacting debt indexation could make it fully effective at the
beginning of the following year. 167 After that date, all debt would
be indexed for inflation. Creditors would be required to pay an
indexation surcharge equal to 1.67% of the indexable basis of all
pre-existing fixed-rate debt but they would be permitted to deduct
an additional 1.67% of indexable basis from nominal income in
computing taxable interest income. Similarly, debtors would receive
a tax credit equal to 1.67% of the indexable basis of all pre-existing
fixed-rate debt but they also would be required to reduce their
interest deduction by this amount. This scheme should be reason-
ably effective in adjusting the effective pre-tax interest rate faced by
parties with pre-existing debt to that which would have been agreed
upon had the parties known debt indexation would be applied to
their debt.
V. TREATMENT OF SPECIFIC CLASSES OF DEBT UNDER INDEXATION
Debt indexation proposals have frequently been criticized on the
grounds of administrative complexity.168  This part attempts to
counter this criticism by suggesting administrable methods for
indexing various classes of debt. For simplicity of exposition, this
part will not attempt to integrate transition rules with the methods
166 0.0167 = 0.05 x 0.25 / (1 - 0.25). See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
167 Some such delay in effective date would be necessary on administrative rather
than transitional grounds.
168 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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suggested. The major administrative difficulty in implementing
debt indexation is the determination of the taxpayer's indexable
basis in his debt.169 Because this is also the major administrative
problem in implementing transition rules for indexation, the
following discussion should be readily extensible to the transition
area.
This part assumes that a single inflation indexation rate will be
applied to debt held for any portion of a taxpayer's taxable year and
that this rate will be calculated and published by the Internal
Revenue Service. Use of quarterly or monthly indexation rates
clearly would be more precise and hence less subject to abuse.
However, the additional administrative burden entailed by the use
of multiple rates within a taxable year is probably not warranted.
Given this assumption, where the principal amount of a debt varies
over the course of a taxable year, indexation can be based on the
average balance of the debt during that year. Similarly, where debt
is held for only a fraction of a taxable year, the annual indexation
adjustment can simply be prorated over the holding period.
170
For simplicity, the following discussion assumes that debt is always
held for a full taxable year.
A. Qualified Residence Indebtedness
Homeowners have traditionally been accorded a number of tax
preferences. 171  Requiring homeowners to index qualified resi-
169 Once the taxpayer's indexable basis is determined, calculation of the inflation
adjustment itself is quite simple. The taxpayer's indexable basis is multiplied by the
inflation rate to produce the inflation adjustment. See, e.g., supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
170 Cf. I.R.C. § 1271(a)(3)-(a)(4) (1988) (ratable characterization of gain from sale
of short-term government obligations acquired at a discount and of gain from sale of
short-term nongovernment original issue discount obligations as ordinary income);
id. § 1272(a) (ratable imputation within each accrual period of original issue discount
on long-term debt instruments); id. § 1276 (ratable accrual of market discount); id.
§§ 1281, 1283 (ratable inclusion in income of acquisition discount and interest on
certain short-term obligations).
171 Like all owners of capital assets, homeowners benefit from the tax deferral
created by the realization requirement, see id. § 1001, and from the step-up in basis
at death. See id. § 1014. The value of these benefits is magnified by the liberal
rollover provisions applicable to the sale of a principal residence. See id. § 1034.
Also, homeowners who are age 55 or older are permitted a one-time exclusion of up
to $125,000 of gain from the sale of a principal residence. See id. § 121. Finally,
although the deductibility of consumer interest was generally eliminated by the 1986
Tax Reform Act, Congress created an exception for "qualified residence interest" that
retains the deductibility of most home mortgage interest. See id. § 163(h)(2)(D).
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dence indebtedness would significantly reduce the tax benefit of
home ownership.1 72 Congress might, therefore, choose to exempt
qualified residence indebtedness from indexation by the borrow-
er.173 Presumably, home mortgage lenders would still be permit-
ted to index.174 Although this would produce a revenue loss,
1 75
it would be a loss that reflected the cost of subsidizing home owner-
ship, a policy clearly espoused by Congress.
One problem with such an exemption is that it would provide
an incentive to homeowners to acquire and maintain the maximum
amount of unindexed home mortgage debt and to invest any
proceeds in excess of those needed to finance the home in indexed
assets. 176 Even if Congress decided to subsidize home ownership
by exempting home mortgage borrowers from indexation, it
probably would not want to subsidize those homeowners who do not
need to borrow to finance the purchase of their homes. This
arbitrage opportunity could be eliminated by limiting any income-
reducing indexation adjustment to the amount that exceeds the
foregone home mortgage indexation adjustment.
1 77
Assuming that Congress decides not to exempt qualified
residence indebtedness from indexation by the borrower, the
administrative problems involved with indexing home mortgage
debt would be minimal. To calculate his indexation adjustment, a
172 Interest rates would fall somewhat as a result of debt indexation, benefiting
homeowners. But it is unlikely that rates would fall enough to offset fully the tax
burden ofindexinghome mortgage debtbecause mortgage-holding homeowners are
generally relatively high bracket taxpayers and their lost interest deductions are,
therefore, relatively valuable.
173 The Treasury I debt indexation proposal, for example, would have excluded
"mortgage ... indebtedness secured by or allocable to [a] principal residence."
TREASURY I, supra note 59, at 194-95.
174 Eliminating indexation for home mortgage lenders would cause lenders to
demand higher interest rates on home mortgage debt than on indexed debt.
Assuming that home mortgage borrowers were exempted from indexation because
Congress desired to confer a tax benefit upon them, exempting home mortgage
lenders would undermine this benefit by imposing higher interest rates on them. It
would also result in tax-exempt lenders becoming the major providers of home
mortgage credit, so there would ultimately be little revenue pickup from eliminating
indexation for these lenders.175 See stupra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
176 See TREASURY I, supra note 59, at 198; Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at
359. Even under a scheme that only indexed debt, homeowners could invest
unneeded mortgage proceeds in interest-bearing assets to achieve additional tax
deductions. Of course, a similar potential exists under present law via investments
in tax-deferred capital assets, so it is unclear how seriously this new arbitrage
opportunity should be taken.
177 See Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 1, at 359-60.
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homeowner would need to know his average mortgage principal
balance. This amount would then be multiplied by the inflation
indexation rate published by the Internal Revenue Service to
produce the indexation adjustment. Homeowners already need to
know the amount of qualified home mortgage interest paid if they
wish to deduct it. 178 Many homeowners obtain this figure from
the mortgagee, who is generally required to report to the homeown-
er the amount of mortgage interest he has received. 179 Some
mortgagees also report the average mortgage principal balance, and
the marginal cost of requiring all mortgagees to do so would be very
small. Most homeowners could thus obtain their average mortgage
principal balance directly from these reports without any need for
complicated calculations. For those homeowners who would need
to compute their own average balance, use of approximate methods
could be authorized by Regulation to simplify this process. Average
principal balance is already needed by some taxpayers to determine
the amount of interest eligible for the qualified residence interest
deduction, and the Treasury has already promulgated regulations
authorizing the use of approximate methods for the computation of
average principal balance in this context.18 0 These same methods
could be used to calculate the average principal balance for
indexation.
B. Consumer Debt and Commercial Credit
Most interest on consumer debt is classified as nondeductible
personal interest.1 8 1 Where interest is nondeductible, no index-
ation adjustment by the borrower is necessary. Otherwise, interest
is generally deductible as a trade or business, investment, or passive
activity expense, subject to certain limitations.18 2 Computation
178 If a homeowner chooses not to deduct qualified home mortgage interest, it is
unnecessary to index his home mortgage debt.
179 Section 6050H of the Code, see I.R.C. § 6050H (1988), imposes a return
requirement on any person who, in the course of his trade or business, receives $600
or more of mortgage interest from any individual during a calendar year. These
mortgagees are also required to report to the mortgagor on a Form 1098, or a
comparable information return, the amount of mortgage interest received. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.6050H-2(b) (1988).
180 These methods include computation of the average principal balance by
dividing interest paid by the annual interest rate, computation by averaging beginning
and ending principal balances, and use of the highest annual principal balance as an
approximation for average principal balance. See Treas. Reg. § 1.163-10T(h) (1988).
'81 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2) (1988).
182 See id. § 163.
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of the indexation adjustment for such debt could be facilitated by
requiring institutional lenders to report average principal balances.
Because interest on revolving credit is usually calculated on the
basis of average balance, the incremental burden of requiring
lenders to report this information should be minimal. Furthermore,
indexation will require lenders to calculate their overall average
outstanding balance in order to compute their own indexation
adjustment. This calculation will presumably involve tracking the
average balances of outstanding debt, so even lenders who do not
calculate interest on the basis of average principal balances should
have this information available.183 Taxpayers with deductible
interest expenses could calculate their inflation adjustments by
multiplying the reported average balance by the applicable index-
ation rate for their taxable year. To further facilitate indexation for
calendar year taxpayers, lenders might also be required to perform
this calculation and to report interest expense net of the inflation
adjustment.
C. Bank and Money Market Deposits
Financial institutions are presently required to furnish taxpayers
with an annual statement of aggregate interest payments. i 4
Computation of the indexation adjustment for depositors could be
facilitated by modifying these reporting requirements to include the
reporting of average balances, or even of interest income net of the
inflation adjustment. Interest on deposits is also generally calculat-
ed on the basis of average balances, so this new requirement should
impose relatively little additional burden on the reporting institu-
tions.
183 Financial lenders might instead be permitted to calculate their indexation
adjustment directly from their net equity. In this case, tracking and reporting
individual average balances would be a more significant burden but certainly not an
unbearable one.
18 With some limited exceptions, see I.R.C. § 6049(b)(2) (1988), § 6049 of the
Code, see I.R.C. § 6049 (1988), imposes a return requirement on any person making
aggregate interest payments of $10 or more to another person during a calendar year.
These borrowers are also required to report to the payee on a Form 1099, or a
comparable information notice, the amount of interest paid. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6049-6 (1983).
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D. Government and Corporate Bonds
Theoretically, a bond should be indexed based upon the
bondholder's basis in the bond, not the actual market value of the
bond.1 85 The amount of the indexation adjustment should be the
taxpayer's basis in the bond multiplied by the percentage increase
in the inflation index. Because the Code does not generally impose
mark-to-market taxation on bonds,186 there would be no adminis-
trative advantage to indexing based on actual market value rather
than basis.
Indexing debt will not be necessary for most issuers of govern-
ment bonds because such issuers are typically tax exempt.187 For
issuers of corporate bonds, indexation will present only an incre-
mental burden. The indexation adjustment will simply be the
corporation's total basis in its outstanding bonds multiplied by the
annual percentage increase in the inflation index. This calculation
will generally be very simple. 188 There should be no additional
recordkeeping burden because corporations already track their basis
in outstanding bonds for both tax and accounting purposes.
The potential complexity of indexation for holders of govern-
ment and corporate bonds is far greater than for issuers. In
addition to purchase price and original issue discount, a bond-
holder's basis can also be affected by acquisition premium, market
discount, and amortizable bond premium, all of which complicate
185 The bondholder's basis represents the capital cost of producing interest
income. Because the basis is denominated in historical, uninflated dollars, while
interest income is measured in current, inflated dollars, it is the bondholder's basis
that must be adjusted to current dollars to neutralize the effect of inflation on the
measurement of net income. Cf. supra note 65 (noting that a failure to adjust for
inflation in computing net income greatly overstates real capital income).
186 Dealers in securities may, however, value their inventory ofsecurities either at
market value or at the lower of cost or market. See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-5 (as amended
in 1987). The President's 1993 budget proposal would require securities dealers to
value securities held as inventory at market value. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAX'N, 102 CONG., 2D SESS., SUMMARY OF REVENUE PROPOSALS IN THE PRESIDENT'S
FIsCAL YEAR 1993 BUDGET 30-31 (Comm. Print 1992).
187 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(1) (1988); see also ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 78, at
§11.03. To the extent that issuers of government debt may not be tax-exempt in
some instances, indexation by such issuers would be similar to indexation by
corporate issuers.
188 To the extent that some corporate bonds are original issue discount
instruments, basis must be adjusted annually to accrue original issue discount. This
adjustment is already made under present law as the original issue discount is
deducted under § 163(e) of the Code, see I.R.C. §163(e) (1988), so indexation would
pose no additional burden in this respect.
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the computation of the indexation adjustment. This additional
complexity is exacerbated by the fact that many bondholders are
individual taxpayers. An administrable indexation scheme for these
bondholders must, therefore, rely on a combination of increased
reporting requirements and the assumed sophistication of certain
classes of bondholders.
In general, a bondholder's indexation adjustment will be his
average basis in the bond for the taxable year multiplied by the
annual indexation rate. Consider the original purchaser of a
government or corporate bond issued at par. The bondholder's
basis in this instance is the par value of the bond, and this basis is
fixed for as long as the original purchaser holds the bond. These
bondholders could be required to attain their basis annually from
their own financial records. A better solution, however, would be
to require issuers to include this figure on the annual interest
statement that they are already required to send to bondhold-
ers.18 9 This new reporting requirement would impose only a
slight incremental burden on bond issuers and the bondholder
could simply use the reported figure as his basis for indexation.
This reporting requirement could also facilitate indexation for
original purchasers of original issue discount bonds ("OID bonds").
Instead of reporting par value, the issuer of an OID bond could be
required to report the bond's adjusted issue price. 190 The issuer
already needs to maintain this figure in order to calculate the
amount of original issue discount he may take as an interest
deduction, 191 so the additional reporting burden would be mini-
mal. Holders of OID bonds could easily approximate their average
basis by adding half of their current original issue discount to the
adjusted issue price because these would both be reported on the
annual Form 1099-OID sent to the bondholder. Alternatively,
issuers could be required to make this calculation and report the
approximate indexable basis figure. An exact method based on
average accrued daily portions of original issue discount could be
prescribed for large bondholders to avoid abuse. This reporting
requirement would simplify indexation for most original holders of
OID bonds because they would not need to compute their indexable
basis.
189 See id. § 6049; Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-6 (1983).
190 See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(3)-(4) (1988).
191 See id. § 163(e).
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When a bond is purchased after its original issue, the secondary
bondholder's initial basis is his cost, a figure not generally known
to the bond's original issuer. When such a bond is purchased for
less than its stated redemption price or, in the case of a bond with
original issue discount, for less than its issue price plus accrued
original issue discount, this deficit is called market discount.
19 2
Market discount need not be recognized periodically like original
issue discount-instead it may be accrued and recognized upon
disposition of the bond.1 93 The bondholder's basis will therefore
be less than the anticipated value of the market discount bond.
This will produce an anticipated tax deferral for the holder of the
market discount bond.194 This tax deferral problem is indepen-
dent from the problems addressed by debt indexation19 5 and is
one our tax system has generally been willing to tolerate. 196 It is
proper, therefore, to index such bonds by the bondholder's basis,
rather than attempting to recapture any of the benefit of this tax
deferral through a reduced indexation adjustment. Because market
discount is not recaptured over the term of the bond, the bond-
holder's basis will always be the same as the basis would have been
for the original purchaser of the bond minus the amount of market
discount at purchase. The average basis for holders of market
discount bonds will be easily calculated by subtracting the known
amount of market discount from the indexable basis figure reported
by the issuer on the annual interest statement.
When a bond is purchased at a price exceeding it original issue
price plus any accrued original issue discount, this excess, called
acquisition premium, is used to reduce the amount of original issue
discount subsequently recognized by the secondary bondhold-
er.197 Because proper treatment of acquisition premium already
demands sophisticated computations and extensive record keeping,
it is reasonable to require taxpayers holding such instruments to
192 See id. §1278(a)(2); see also ROSE & CHOMMIE, supra note 78, at §7.12.
193 See I.R.C. § 1276 (1988). Bondholders may elect to recognize market discount
as it accrues. See id. § 1278(b).
19 The Code attempts to limit the advantage of this deferral by requiring the
deferral of interest deductions on debt incurred or continued to purchase or carry
market discount bonds. See id. § 1277.
195 They are related only in that inflation increases the value of tax deferral,
magnifying the problem.
96 But see I.R.C. § 453A (1988) (imposing a surtax to recapture benefit of
deferred tax liability in certain installment sales); id. § 1291 (imposing a surtax to
recapture benefit ofdeferral on income from passive foreign investment companies).
197 See id. § 1272(a)(7), (b)(4).
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perform their own average basis calculations for purposes of
computing their indexation adjustment. Finally, when a bond is
purchased for a price exceeding its stated redemption price, this
excess may, at the taxpayer's election, be treated as amortizable
bond premium and used to offset interest income received on the
bond.198 Again, because such treatment already requires sophisti-
cated calculations, including annual adjustments to basis, and
because amortization is elective, taxpayers making such an election
should be capable of calculating their average basis.
E. Indexed Debt
It is possible for taxpayers to construct variable rate debt
instruments that are automatically indexed for inflation. These
instruments typically bear a fixed real interest rate and provide for
periodic adjustments in the outstanding debt principal or supple-
mental interest payments at a variable rate based on some inflation
index. The taxation of such instruments under current law is
complex. The Treasury has issued temporary regulations prescrib-
ing the tax treatment of price level adjusted mortgages, one form of
indexed debt.199 Under these regulations, a certain portion of
the variable interest on a price level adjusted mortgage is treated as
original issue discount. 200 Treatment of other indexed debt
instruments is less certain, but would likely invoke the original issue
discount rules for variable rate debt.
20 1
Under a system of debt indexation, the treatment of indexed
debt would be much simpler. Assuming that the inflation index
used by debt instruments was the same as the index used by the
Code,202 taxable interest would equal the real, fixed-rate interest
on the indexed debt. All the variable rate interest, whether paid as
supplemental interest or added to debt principal, could simply be
excluded from taxable income. There would be no need to subject
the debt to the original issue discount rules.
198 See id. § 171.
1" See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-6T (1990).
200 See id. § 1.1275-6T(d).
201 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-5, 51 Fed. Reg. 12094 (1986). In effect, any
portion of the indexation adjustment that is added to the principal balance rather
than being paid currently as interest must be recognized as current interest through
the original issue discount rules.
202 It is unlikely that issuers of indexed debt would choose a different index at the
expense of greater complexity. The debt indexation rules might also choose to
respect the use of other inflation indices provided they meet certain general criteria.
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F. De Minimis Rules for Individuals
Along with new reporting requirements, the use of de minimis
rules could substantially reduce the administrative burden of debt
indexation for individual taxpayers. The Treasury I debt indexation
proposal, for example, would have excluded the first $5,000 of an
individual's interest expense from indexation.20  Given the
present nondeductibility of personal interest and the imposition of
new reporting requirements, such a generous exclusion is unneces-
sary.20 4 A more reasonable de minimis rule might exempt indi-
viduals with net debt not exceeding $10,000 from debt index-
ation.20 5 An alternative approach would be to exempt only
specific types of loans not exceeding some threshold amount.
20 6
CONCLUSION
The magnitude of the tax base distortions created by the failure
to index debt has declined substantially since the early 1980s due to
both lower rates of inflation and lower tax rates. Furthermore, the
introduction of interest tracing rules has reduced the availability of
tax arbitrage based on the taxation of nominal interest. Nonethe-
less, even at present rates of inflation and taxation, our current
system of taxing debt continues to produce inequities and economic
distortions that could be eliminated by debt indexation. The
203 See TREASURY I, supra note 59, at 195. The Treasury I proposal based its
indexation adjustment on aggregate interest rather than principal balances. Seesupra
note 92.
204 With annual inflation of 6%, Treasury I would have imposed a fractional
exclusion rate of 50%. See TREASURY I, supra note 59, at 196. Thus the $5,000 de
minimis exclusion would have permitted some taxpayers an additional $2,500
deduction. Assuming a maximum tax rate of 33%, this exclusion could have been
worth up to $825. This $5,000 de minimis exclusion was also partially justified as a
transition rule, although Treasury I never stated when this exclusion would be
reduced or eliminated. See id. at 198. As a transition rule, this exclusion, which is
similar to a phased-in effective date rule, is quite unsatisfactory. See supra notes 155-
56 and accompanying text.
205 Again assuming annual inflation of 6% and a maximum tax rate of 33%, the
maximum tax cost of this de minimis exemption would be less than $200. De
minimis rules of similar generosity exist elsewhere in the Code. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 7872(c)(2) (1988) (providing de minimis exception from the below-market interest
rules for gift loans between individuals not exceeding $10,000).
20 Cf id. § 7872(c)(2)-(3) (1988) (providing $10,000 de minimis exception from
below-market interest rules for gift loans between individuals, compensation-related
loans, and corporate-shareholder loans). Adopting an identical exception for debt
indexation would simplify the integration of indexation with the existing interest
provisions.
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present climate of lower inflation and lower tax rates presents an
ideal opportunity for a transition to debt indexation because it
reduces the magnitude of the windfalls that such a transition would
necessarily create. The administrative burden of debt indexation
for individual taxpayers could be minimized through new reporting
requirements and de minimis rules. Only sophisticated taxpayers
would be likely to experience a significant additional burden as a
result of indexation. Congress has already demonstrated its
willingness to impose similarly complex rules in taxing debt. Debt
indexation should not be dismissed as administratively infeasible
and even under the present economic climate, it remains a reform
worthy of serious consideration.

